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INTRODUCTION
Waiver of personal jurisdiction is a long-standing tenet of federal
and state civil procedure.1  The scope of such waiver, particularly in-
† B.A., The University of Oklahoma, 2011; Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School,
2014; Editor-in-Chief, Cornell Law Review, Volume 99.  I would sincerely like to thank all
members of the Cornell Law Review for their hard work and dedication, especially Steve Ma,
Nate Taylor, Anthony “T.J.” Vita, Conor McCormick, Catherine Eisenhut, and Zachary
Glantz.
1 See Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495, 495–96 (1956) (finding
that the court could exercise personal jurisdiction where the defendant had filed a stipula-
tion voluntarily submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the court); Chi. Life Ins. Co. v.
225
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voluntary waiver, has slowly expanded, culminating in the Supreme
Court case of Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee.2  The Second Circuit’s recent decision in City of New York v.
Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, however, pushes the bounds of waiver be-
yond practicality and fairness, and redefines the theoretical principles
of personal jurisdiction.3  While Mickalis Pawn represents a single cir-
cuit’s interpretation of personal jurisdiction, describing waiver of per-
sonal jurisdiction strictly in terms of individual rights has implications
for all personal-jurisdiction cases decided in the Second Circuit and
brings into question the applicability of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz4 that federalism interests still lurk
within personal jurisdiction.
In Mickalis Pawn, the Second Circuit determined that defendants
who timely raised but unsuccessfully litigated the affirmative defense
of personal jurisdiction and then defaulted on the judgment could
not challenge personal jurisdiction either through collateral attack or
direct appeal.5  The defendants, firearms dealers based outside the
forum state of New York, had determined that failure at the trial on
the merits was a “foregone conclusion” and that their best litigation
strategy was to focus their defense on personal jurisdiction.6  The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, found this strategy to be unacceptable.  It deter-
mined that the defendants had forfeited their right of appeal or
collateral attack by (1) appearing to defend the case and (2) default-
ing on the judgment after two adverse rulings on personal
jurisdiction.7
The holding in Mickalis Pawn opens up a critical discussion about
the role of horizontal federalist interests in personal jurisdiction and
specifically raises some questions about the consideration of federalist
interests like judicial efficiency and fairness to the plaintiffs when ex-
amining waiver of personal jurisdiction.  The omission of such inter-
ests in Mickalis Pawn is difficult to reconcile with Burger King, and the
resulting tension may have a crucial impact on how district courts in
the Second Circuit view and treat waiver of personal jurisdiction.
Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1917) (recognizing the variation among states as to what con-
stitutes a waiver of personal jurisdiction).
2 Insurance Corp. of Ireland allowed courts to impose a presumption of fact regarding
personal jurisdiction as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery procedures. See 456
U.S. 694, 706–07 (1982); infra Part I.B.
3 See 645 F.3d 114, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2011).
4 See 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (noting the importance of the forum state’s inter-
est and the interstate judicial system’s efficiency interest to the determination of personal
jurisdiction).
5 645 F.3d at 132–33.
6 Id. at 119, 124.
7 Id. at 139–40.
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This Note argues that in the context of modern jurisprudence
interpreting personal jurisdiction as an individual right construed
within the framework of horizontal federalism, Mickalis Pawn creates
an unnecessary tension between the individual rights and federalist
interests that are at work in personal jurisdiction.  This Note further
argues that Mickalis Pawn is problematic in the theoretical framework
it lays for district courts and in the practical difficulty of applying the
rule announced by Mickalis Pawn.
Part I gives background on the state of personal jurisdiction and
waiver of personal jurisdiction.  It also gives the facts and holding
from Mickalis Pawn.  Part II discusses the holding in Mickalis Pawn and
discusses the theoretical and factual analysis the Second Circuit ap-
plied that seems at odds with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
personal jurisdiction.  Part III discusses the theoretical and practical
problems that may arise when district courts try to use Mickalis Pawn as
precedent for the framework of personal jurisdiction.  The final sec-
tion is a conclusion.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Theory of Personal Jurisdiction
The foundational principles of personal jurisdiction are most
readily apparent in Pennoyer v. Neff, the landmark Supreme Court case
determining that power over the defendant is a necessary prerequisite
to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction.8 Pennoyer arguably grounded this
principle in the notion that states, as sovereign entities, are entitled to
adjudicate disputes within their own borders and prevent other sover-
eign states from imposing foreign judgments on their citizens.9  Not-
withstanding this framework, although Pennoyer focused its discussion
on the power of the forum state over the defendant, the Court simul-
taneously described jurisdictional rules as necessary “for the protec-
tion and enforcement of private rights.”10
8 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) (“[T]he validity of . . . judgments may be directly ques-
tioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a
court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that
court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”).
9 See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstrac-
tion in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 702 (1983). But
see James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for
Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 207 (2004) (“When the grand but irrelevant principles
and extensive quotations are stripped away [from Pennoyer], what is left is a small emenda-
tion to the basic attachment rule—an exception calculated to vindicate individual rights by
increasing the likelihood that the defendant will have actual notice of the proceeding.”
(emphasis added)).
10 95 U.S. at 733.
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Pennoyer’s rigid test of strict territoriality soon gave way to other
bases of power.11  These expansions of power, though practically im-
perative, struggled to reconcile themselves with Pennoyer’s statement
of sovereign power as the source of jurisdiction.12  Perhaps the most
troubling and inconsistent of these expansions was consent: the idea
that individual citizens could voluntarily forfeit their sovereign state’s
interest in adjudicating the claims of its own citizens.13  The best ex-
planation the Court could come up with was that the forum state’s
interests somehow justified a deviation from the rigid Pennoyer stan-
dards of personal jurisdiction.14
The Supreme Court finally “rationalized these developments”15
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.16  The Court recast personal ju-
risdiction in terms of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice”17 and the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.18  Even as
the landscape of personal jurisdiction has shifted, these two principles
remain central to the Court’s idea of personal jurisdiction.19  But it is
unclear how the Court envisioned this test playing out in lower courts,
as the relationship between the defendant’s contacts and “fair play”
was ambiguous.20  Whatever the relationship, however, the decision
subtly but unambiguously shifted the focus of personal jurisdiction
from the power of the sovereign state to the individual rights of the
defendant.21
11 See Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal
Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 415 (1981) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)
(domicile); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (consent); Fisher v. Fielding, 34 A. 714
(Conn. 1895) (presence)).
12 See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under
Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1984).
13 See id.  Lewis rightly points out that although the Supreme Court described consent
to personal jurisdiction as a knowing forfeiture of sovereign power, most examples in-
volved interstate motorists who likely were oblivious to the fact that they were “consenting”
to the personal jurisdiction of the state they were in. Id. at 6 (citing Hess, 274 U.S. 352;
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916)).
14 See Lewis, supra note 9, at 705. R
15 Clermont, supra note 11, at 415. R
16 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
17 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
18 Id. at 319.
19 See Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal
Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 5.
20 See Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L.
REV. 753, 762–63 (2003) (arguing that the ambiguity of the language suggests that the
Court intended lower courts to use a flexible reasonableness test in determining personal
jurisdiction).
21 See Lewis, supra note 9, at 706 (“The Court’s clear concern here is with ‘fairplay and R
substantial justice’ from the standpoint of the defendant, not the sovereign.”).  Lewis ac-
knowledges that the Court later identified passages in International Shoe that suggested a
lingering concern with state sovereignty, but Lewis contends that these statements are gen-
eralized recognitions that the interests of the defendant should be construed within the
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Following International Shoe, courts struggled to implement the
new reasonableness test, which grounded personal jurisdiction in the
individual rights of the defendant.22  The Court began to integrate
the plaintiff’s and the forum state’s interests into the analysis,23 subtly
challenging the notion that personal jurisdiction should be centered
on the individual rights of the defendant.24  The theory of state sover-
eignty as the underlying principle of personal jurisdiction made its
most significant comebacks in Hanson v. Denckla25 and again later in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.26  These cases mark two short-
lived pockets where state sovereignty and power returned as the domi-
nating force of personal jurisdiction.27
The Court in Hanson described restrictions on personal jurisdic-
tion as a “consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States.”28  While it is unclear how much this comment
marked a commitment to federalism as a defining principle of per-
sonal jurisdiction, this invocation of states’ power unequivocally rein-
serted federalism into the personal-jurisdiction dialogue.29
The Court in World-Wide spoke more forcefully on the issue and
announced that the “sovereignty of each State . . . implie[s] a limita-
tion on the sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express
or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment.”30  The Court went on to explicitly invoke
federalism by adding that “the Due Process Clause, acting as an instru-
ment of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of
its power to render a valid judgment.”31
framework of the federal system. See id. at 706–08 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980)).
22 See Nicholas R. Spampata, Note, King Pennoyer Dethroned: A Policy-Analysis-Influenced
Study of the Limits of Pennoyer v. Neff in the Jurisdictional Environment of the Internet, 85 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1742, 1747–48 (2000) (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
23 See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (“It cannot be denied that California has a manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse
to pay claims.”); Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (“[T]he con-
tacts and ties of appellants with Virginia residents, together with that state’s interest in
faithful observance of the certificate obligations, justify subjecting appellants to cease and
desist proceedings under § 6.”).
24 See Lewis, supra note 9, at 709 n.55. R
25 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
26 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980).
27 See Lewis, supra note 9, at 709–18 (discussing the renewed consideration of state R
sovereignty in Hanson and its subsequent demise in later decisions).
28 357 U.S. at 251.
29 See Lewis, supra note 9, at 710–11. R
30 444 U.S. at 293.
31 Id. at 294 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251, 254).
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This revival of state sovereignty in Hanson and World-Wide, how-
ever, was soon cut short by the Court’s decision in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.32
B. Insurance Corp. of Ireland and Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction
The notion that defendants could waive their challenge to the
court’s jurisdiction over them extends as far back as 1809, when the
Supreme Court in Pollard v. Dwight determined that the defendant, by
appearing to defend in the action, waived his objection to the jurisdic-
tion of the court.33  Following Pennoyer, the Court soon reaffirmed the
availability of waiver, notwithstanding Pennoyer’s insistence on power
over the defendant.34  The Court in Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry
expanded and elaborated upon this notion, clarifying that although
“a court cannot conclude [that] all persons interested [are under its
jurisdiction] by its mere assertion of its own power,” “[i]f a statute
should provide that filing a plea in abatement, or taking the question
to a higher court should [submit the defendant to the court’s jurisdic-
tion], it could not be said to deny due process of law.”35  The Court in
Chicago Life Insurance and other post-Pennoyer cases did its best to
frame waiver of personal jurisdiction in terms consistent with the dis-
cussion of state sovereignty found in Pennoyer.36
But as the Court’s theory of personal jurisdiction evolved, so did
its perception of waiver, and the Court’s decision in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland arguably marked the Court’s contention that personal jurisdic-
tion is fundamentally an individual right under the Due Process
Clause.37  The case is best known for allowing lower courts to presume
32 456 U.S. 694 (1982); see Lewis, supra note 9, at 718. R
33 8 U.S. 421, 428–29 (1808).  At that time, the Court considered the issue of jurisdic-
tion only generally, and an appearance by the defendant waived all rights to challenge the
jurisdiction of the court on either the grounds of territoriality or improper service. Id.; see
also Logan v. Patrick, 9 U.S. 288, 288 (1809) (holding that the court below was entitled to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant, who had been served
outside the court’s district, appeared to answer the bill and did not initially object to the
court’s jurisdiction).
34 See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 21 (1890) (holding that it was constitutional for a
Texas statute to stipulate that defendants who appeared to argue any part of the suit sub-
mitted themselves to the jurisdiction of that court).  The Court admitted that it would be
more convenient to allow the defendant to appear in the Texas court solely to challenge
personal jurisdiction, but stated that “mere convenience is not substance of right.” Id.
35 244 U.S. 25, 29–30 (1917).
36 See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927) (describing waiver of per-
sonal jurisdiction by the defendants as the sovereign power of the state to exclude inter-
state motorists unless they consent to the jurisdiction of the state courts).
37 456 U.S. at 704 (“In sum, the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be inten-
tionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue.
These characteristics portray it for what it is—a legal right protecting the individual.”); see
also Lewis, supra note 9, at 723–24 (arguing that Insurance Corp. of Ireland firmly cast away R
the sovereignty concepts shortly revived by World-Wide).  Weinstein argues that the Court’s
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jurisdictional facts against the defendant as a sanction for the defen-
dant’s failure to comply with discovery orders.38  The Court began its
analysis by recognizing the host of existing ways a defendant could
waive the right to personal jurisdiction and concluded that the possi-
bility of waiver necessarily defined personal jurisdiction as an individ-
ual right subject to defined procedural limitations and rules.39  The
defendants sought to distinguish personal jurisdiction from other in-
stances of discovery sanctions, but the Court insisted that “[b]y sub-
mitting to the jurisdiction of the court for the limited purpose of
challenging jurisdiction, the defendant agrees to abide by that court’s
determination on the issue of jurisdiction: That decision will be res
judicata on that issue in any further proceedings.”40
In a critical footnote, Justice White repudiated the claim that
identifying personal jurisdiction as an individual right would elimi-
nate the “minimum contacts” test.41  White argued that the limitations
on state sovereign power described in other cases are “ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Pro-
cess Clause.”42
Despite the Court’s insistence that personal jurisdiction exists
solely as an individual right pursuant to the Due Process Clause, two
subsequent cases cast considerable doubt on the Court’s belief in that
theory.  In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court reaffirmed World-
Wide’s holding that factors such as the burden on the defendant, the
forum state’s interest in hearing the claim, the plaintiff’s interest in
efficiency, the interstate judicial system’s interest in efficiency, and all
states’ interests in “furthering fundamental substantive social policies”
are relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction.43  The Court’s later
decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court was a mess of con-
curring and dissenting opinions, but a majority of the Court agreed
analysis of waiver is flawed and that notions of federalism and state sovereignty still have a
place in the theory of personal jurisdiction. See Weinstein, supra note 9, at 296–99.  Despite R
these objections, however, Weinstein admits that the decision represents a clear move by
the Court towards individual rights as the underlying theory of personal jurisdiction. See
id. at 296.
38 See Robert J. Faris, Note, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee: Justifying the Establishment of Jurisdiction as a Discovery Sanction, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
1446, 1446–47, 1448–49 (1982).
39 456 U.S. at 703–05.
40 Id. at 706.
41 Id. at 702–03 n.10.
42 Id. This seems to comport with the Court’s contention in International Shoe that
“[personal jurisdiction] demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of govern-
ment, to require the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”
326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
43 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
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that the interests of the forum state and the interests of other states in
“furthering fundamental substantive social policies” were relevant
considerations for personal jurisdiction.44  Though somewhat ambigu-
ous, these cases seem to hint at the lingering presence of state sover-
eignty in personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence.45
C. The Mickalis Pawn Case
This unresolved tension between personal jurisdiction as purely
an individual right versus the role of federalism as context for per-
sonal jurisdiction set the stage for a critical case of waiver in the Sec-
ond Circuit.  While the Second Circuit’s decision in City of New York v.
Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, is problematic in more than one way, its cru-
cial failure is its neglect of horizontal federalism as a foundational
principle of personal jurisdiction.
1. The Facts
In 2006, the City of New York brought suit in the Eastern District
of New York against fifteen out-of-state firearms dealers, alleging that
the dealers had engaged in unlawful sales practices that amounted to
a public nuisance in the City.46  Notwithstanding this allegation, the
defendant–appellant dealers had never done business in the state of
New York, nor had they ever shipped guns out of their home states to
New York or any other state.47
Five defendants, including Mickalis Pawn Shop, timely filed a mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.48  The district court
denied the motion after jurisdictional discovery, arguing that since
the City only had to show a substantial likelihood of personal jurisdic-
tion at the pleading stage, the evidence of firearms being “fun-
nel[ed]” into the City was “sufficient to provide the minimum contacts
necessary for an exercise of personal jurisdiction.”49  The defendants
attempted to obtain an interlocutory appeal on the issue of personal
jurisdiction, but the court denied that request.50  The City soon filed
an amended complaint, and the defendants again moved to dismiss
44 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292).
45 See Spampata, supra note 22, at 1751–52. R
46 City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2011).
The City specifically alleged that the dealers engaged in “strawman purchases” that allowed
unlicensed individuals to bring guns into the City. Id.
47 Id. at 120–21.
48 Id. Mickalis Pawn operated a single retail store in South Carolina. Id. at 118.
49 Id. at 121 (quoting City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d
369, 374, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).
50 Id.
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for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the court again denied the mo-
tion on the same grounds.51
By March of 2008, Mr. Mickalis himself had been indicted on
criminal charges.52  Mr. Mickalis opted to devote his limited financial
resources to the criminal case against him, and the three law firms
representing Mickalis Pawn moved to withdraw as counsel.53  Counsel
specifically stated that although the owner of Mickalis Pawn wanted to
focus his attention on the criminal case being brought against him
personally, Mickalis Pawn would continue to assert lack of personal
jurisdiction as a defense and had no intention of waiving that de-
fense.54  Notwithstanding this assertion, counsel communicated that
Mr. Mickalis was aware that the motion to withdraw could result in a
default judgment against him and the granting of the injunctive relief
that the City requested.55  The City subsequently moved to enter de-
fault judgment against Mickalis Pawn over objections from Mickalis
Pawn, now representing itself pro se,56 and the district court granted
the motion and entered default judgment against Mickalis Pawn in
March of 2009.57
Another defendant, Adventure Outdoors, continued with the liti-
gation through discovery, even though all other defendants had ei-
ther settled or defaulted.58  While a third motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction was pending, the district court determined that
the parties were not entitled to a jury and announced that it would sit
as the trier of fact with an advisory jury.59  The very next day, the dis-
trict court denied Adventure Outdoors’ motion for summary
judgment.60
Counsel for Adventure Outdoors, perceiving it to be a “foregone
conclusion” that the trial would be unfair, moved to withdraw during
the jury selection phase but added that Adventure Outdoors intended
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 122.
54 Id. at 121–22.  Mr. Mickalis had sought to stay the proceedings of the civil case until
the resolution of his criminal case, but the district court denied the motion shortly before
counsel for Mickalis Pawn moved to withdraw. Id. at 121–22.
55 Id. at 122.  The Judge told Mr. Mickalis, “[I]f you do not have an attorney to re-
present Mickalis Pawn, then the City is going to move for a default and because corpora-
tions cannot appear in court without counsel, a default will enter. . . .  [T]hat means that
the injunctive relief that the City has requested will in all likelihood be granted.” Id. (alter-
ations in orignal) (quoting Transcript of Civil Cause for Status Conference at 17, City of
New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-CV-
2233), 2008 WL 630483.
56 Id. at 123.
57 Id.
58 Id.  Adventure Outdoors operated a single retail store in Georgia. Id. at 119.
59 Id. at 123.
60 Id.
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to appeal any default judgment against it.61  Counsel for Adventure
Outdoors acknowledged that default was a possibility, and the district
court entered default judgment against Adventure Outdoors in March
of 2009.62  Both Mickalis Pawn and Adventure Outdoors appealed for
lack of personal jurisdiction.63
2. The Opinion
On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that both Mickalis
Pawn and Adventure Outdoors had waived their objections to per-
sonal jurisdiction.64  The court concluded that since the defendants
had waived their jurisdictional objections, it was not the district
court’s burden to consider those defenses sua sponte.65  The court
then held that the district court did not have to consider whether per-
sonal jurisdiction had been established over the defendants before en-
tering default judgment against them.66
The court began by quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland and identify-
ing personal jurisdiction as an individual right that “can, like other
such rights, be waived.”67  The court then pointed out that waiving
personal jurisdiction is possible by failing to raise the defense in the
initial pleadings, failing to actively litigate the defense, or performing
other actions that “amount to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of
the court.”68
61 Id. at 124.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 119.  The defendants also argued that their withdrawal from the litigation did
not justify entering a default judgment against them and that the permanent injunctions
the court imposed were unconstitutional. Id.  This Note focuses solely on the appeal for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 135 (citing e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Given the fact that the Supreme Court still seems to believe that federalism is at least a
component of personal jurisdiction, it is not clear that the district court should not con-
sider personal jurisdiction sua sponte. See supra Part I.B.  The Second Circuit, in its discus-
sion, identified four other circuit decisions holding that in a motion for default judgment,
the district court must first consider whether it has personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. Mickalis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 133 (citing Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir.
2001); In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999); Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-
Tech Int’l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772 (10th Cir. 1997)).  This Note, however, focuses only on
the issue of waiver.
66 Mickalis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 135.
67 Id. at 133 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703 (1982)).
68 Id. at 133–34 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704–05) (citing Hamilton v. Atlas
Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60–62 (2d Cir. 1999); Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d
1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); Cont’l Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993);
Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 538–39 (8th Cir. 1990)).  The defendant in Hamilton—the
case that the Second Circuit cited as persuasive authority in Mickalis Pawn—had failed to
actively litigate the personal-jurisdiction defense for four years before finally filing a mo-
tion to dismiss.  197 F.3d at 61.
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The court relied heavily on e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project in its
analysis.  That Seventh Circuit case held that when a defendant files
an answer arguing lack of personal jurisdiction but then subsequently
withdraws the answer and withdraws from litigation only a month
later, the defendant cannot raise the defense of lack of personal juris-
diction on appeal.69  The Second Circuit relied on this decision to
establish waiver of personal jurisdiction in Mickalis Pawn, concluding
that Adventure Outdoors and Mickalis Pawn had similarly abandoned
their defenses and forfeited the jurisdictional defense.70
In its analysis of waiver, the Second Circuit made no mention of
Mickalis Pawn’s expressed intention to continue to press the affirma-
tive defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.  The application of e360
to the case before the court, in fact, was effectively reduced to a single
sentence: “Similarly, in this case, Adventure Outdoors and Mickalis
Pawn initially litigated their jurisdictional defense, but later changed
course, announcing to the district court that they would cease defend-
ing even though a default would likely result.”71  The remainder of
the court’s discussion on this issue focused on rejecting the applicabil-
ity of the case law the defendants brought forward.72
In the second part of its opinion, the Second Circuit held that
because Mickalis Pawn and Adventure Outdoors had at least partially
litigated before withdrawing, they could not collaterally attack the de-
fault judgment.73  The court reasoned that by appearing in court, the
defendants had submitted themselves to the district court’s determi-
nation of jurisdiction.74  The court consequently foreclosed the possi-
bility of both collateral attack for lack of personal jurisdiction and
direct appeal of the default judgment for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion.75  The court expressed concern that the defendants were trying
to obtain a de facto interlocutory appeal on the issue of personal
jurisdiction.76
The court did briefly acknowledge that although the defendants
had forfeited their personal-jurisdiction rights, the court has discre-
tion to review even forfeited defenses on appeal if the issue is purely
legal and consideration of the issue “is necessary to avoid manifest
injustice.”77  But the court continued and held that it would not exer-
69 See e360, 500 F.3d at 600.
70 See Mickalis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 135.
71 See id. at 135.
72 See id. at 136.
73 Id. at 139–40.
74 Id. (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706
(1982); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1998)).
75 See id. at 139.
76 See id. at 141.
77 Id. at 140 (quoting Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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cise that discretion where the defendants had strategically forfeited
their defense in an effort to force the court to consider the issue of
personal jurisdiction.78
II
MICKALIS PAWN ANALYSIS
The decision in Mickalis Pawn suffers from both an incomplete
theoretical framework and an unclear application of that framework
to the relevant facts.  The Second Circuit’s reliance on e360 is espe-
cially troublesome, as e360, in reality, works against the Second Cir-
cuit’s explanation of personal jurisdiction and waiver.79
A. Fundamental Misunderstandings
1. Theoretical Foundation
The problem with the Second Circuit’s decision in Mickalis Pawn
begins with its theory of personal jurisdiction.  The theoretical back-
ground in Mickalis Pawn is summarized in a single sentence by the
court: “Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents
first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be
waived.”80  While this initial statement of the law is true, the court
does not go far enough in its explanation of personal jurisdiction.
Even as Insurance Corp. of Ireland characterized personal jurisdiction as
an individual right first, the court acknowledged the lingering pres-
ence of state sovereignty as a secondary function of personal jurisdic-
tion.81  Thus, although federalism is not an independent restriction
on personal jurisdiction, it persists as an underlying principle.82
The Second Circuit seems to believe that because personal juris-
diction can be waived, it must be viewed exclusively as an individual
right.  John Drobak points out, however, that Fourth Amendment
rights, which implicate concerns outside of the litigants, can still be
waived.83  Federalism, in fact, seems essential to personal jurisdiction,
as the “minimum contacts” test still espoused by the Supreme Court
hinges on the state’s sovereign right to adjudicate the dispute.84  The
78 Id. at 140.
79 See infra Part II.B.
80 See 645 F.3d at 133 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)).
81 See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702–03 & n.10.
82 See John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV.
1015, 1047–48 (1983).
83 See id. at 1048 n.134 (comparing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) with Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973)).
84 See id. at 1047–48.
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Court in International Shoe similarly believed that state sovereignty was
a necessary, albeit secondary, component of personal jurisdiction.85
It is admittedly questionable whether federalism remains a practi-
cally operative concern when determining the jurisdiction of a
court,86 but the theoretical underpinnings of personal jurisdiction are
important to the creation of practical rules.87  Personal jurisdiction is,
in many ways, an interaction between sovereign authorities.88  With
regard to waiver, a theoretical consideration of sovereign authority is
necessary; finding waiver of personal jurisdiction without considering
sovereign authority creates a circular mode of jurisdiction where the
court relies on its own jurisdictional rules to assert substantive jurisdic-
tion over a defendant.89  The court must evaluate its sovereign author-
ity before imposing rules of consent and waiver on the defendant.90
So, the Second Circuit’s theoretical foundation of personal juris-
diction is not incorrect—it is incomplete.  Although personal jurisdic-
tion exists first as an individual right, the analysis cannot end there.
After all, the Supreme Court has continued to insist that factors such
as the interests of the forum state, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
effective relief, the judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution,
and states’ general interest in substantive social policies are all rele-
vant in the context of personal jurisdiction.91  It would be incongru-
ent for the Court to evaluate these factors while simultaneously
employing an explanation of personal jurisdiction exclusively formu-
lated around individual rights.92  The analysis should begin with per-
sonal jurisdiction as an individual right, but the Supreme Court’s
85 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“Those demands [of per-
sonal jurisdiction] may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to re-
quire the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.”).
86 See Drobak, supra note 82, at 1048 (questioning whether courts should consider R
federalism when determining the vitality of the minimum contacts test).
87 See Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807,
907–08 (2004).  Rhodes points out that personal jurisdiction is not the only scenario where
the Court has considered federalism in the context of the Due Process Clause.  The Court
has acknowledged the importance of state sovereignty in the context of Due Process claims
regarding punitive damages and choice-of-law determinations. See id. at 908–09 (citing
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)).
88 See, e.g., SHAUNNAGH DORSETT & SHAUN MCVEIGH, JURISDICTION 98 (2012) (asserting
that jurisdictional laws create legal “places” that meet and interact through the laws).
89 See Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1989).
Brilmayer describes this practice as “bootstrapping” but argues that such practice is accept-
able so long as the applicable positive laws allow such inferences. See id. at 9, 27.
90 See id. at 27.
91 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
92 The same can arguably be said about the Court’s use of minimum contacts. See
supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Rhodes, supra note 87, at 909–10 (arguing R
that although convenience to state residents and efficiency of the judicial system could also
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holdings make clear that courts should not abandon the federalist
foundations of personal jurisdiction.
2. Jurisdictional Waiver in Other Contexts
This comprehensive formulation of personal jurisdiction is con-
sistent with other instances of personal-jurisdiction waiver.  Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1), for instance, imposes a waiver on
defendants who fail to timely raise the defense of personal jurisdiction
in their answer or first pre-answer motion.93  The purpose of this rule,
however, is not to penalize defendants arbitrarily for improper litiga-
tion practice but to protect plaintiffs and the judicial system from de-
fendants who wish to “re-litigate” a case by waiting until the
disposition of the case before appealing personal jurisdiction.94  Pro-
tection of plaintiffs’ rights, especially foreign plaintiffs’ rights, is a core
concern of federalism served by Rule 12(h)(1)’s waiver rule.95  Addi-
tionally, this concern for judicial efficiency evinces a recognition of
federalist principles at work other than the defendant’s individual due
process.
The discovery sanctions imposed in Insurance Corp. of Ireland are
also evidence of a theory of personal jurisdiction that encompasses
more than just notions of individual due process.  Justice White reaf-
firmed the role of federalism in personal jurisdiction by explaining
that “[i]ndividual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty,
although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he
may otherwise be protected.”96  Similar to Rule 12(h)(1), the discov-
ery sanctions levied in Insurance Corp. of Ireland under Rule 37(b)(2)
are meant not as punishments for careless lawyers but as deterrents to
other litigants who might be tempted to disobey discovery orders.97
be justifications for retaining the minimum contacts test, state sovereignty provides the
best rationale for why the Court has continued to employ the minimum contacts test).
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
94 See Henry Brownstein, Note, Rule 60(B): A Rule Suitable for a Sua Sponte Motion, 15
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 153, 164 (2005) (citing S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1,
48–49 (1897)).
95 Weinstein explains that the concern for plaintiffs’ interests is best explained by the
concerns for interstate federalism. See Weinstein, supra note 9, at 228–29. R
96 Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03
n.10 (1982).
97 See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)
(“[I]t might well be that these respondents would faithfully comply with all future discov-
ery orders entered by the District Court in this case.  But other parties to other lawsuits
would feel freer than we think Rule 37 contemplates they should feel to flout other discov-
ery orders of other district courts.” (emphasis omitted)).  This position has not been with-
out controversy.  District courts still struggle to determine the appropriate magnitude of
discovery sanctions under Rule 37(b).  The Supreme Court, however, has largely remained
silent on the issue. See Jodi Golinsky, Note, The Second Circuit’s Imposition of Litigation-Ending
Sanctions for Failures to Comply with Discovery Orders: Should Rule 37(b)(2) Defaults and Dismis-
sals Be Determined by a Roll of the Dice?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 585, 594–96 (1996) (noting that
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This concern for a competent and efficient judicial system echoes the
Court’s language in Burger King and squares the sanctions in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland with the comprehensive personal jurisdiction theory
suggested by Drobak and others.98
3. Waiver of Individual Rights
The Second Circuit’s theoretical analysis in Mickalis Pawn comes
under more scrutiny when compared with waiver in other contexts.
The exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment, for example, is an
individual right designed to serve the public need of deterring police
misconduct.99  Still, a criminal defendant can inadvertently forfeit the
right to challenge improper evidence by failing to object in a timely
manner.100  Similarly, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause is
framed as a waivable individual right, but its original purpose was to
give the jury an opportunity to evaluate a criminal witness’ demeanor
and trustworthiness.101  Both of these examples undermine the Sec-
ond Circuit’s conclusion that since personal jurisdiction is waivable, it
should be framed exclusively as an individual right.
B. Application of Theory
The Second Circuit’s shaky theoretical foundation might be
harmless if not for its reliance on e360 as the cornerstone for its analy-
sis of waiver.102  The Second Circuit relied on e360 to conclude that
neither it nor the district court below was required to raise the juris-
dictional defense on behalf of the defendants.103  But the Second Cir-
cuit largely misinterpreted the reasoning behind e360.
the Court has not addressed Rule 37(b) since its 1976 National Hockey opinion).  One au-
thor has suggested that the discovery sanctions in Insurance Corp. of Ireland might also be
justified by viewing them as a presumption of fact; that is, failure to comply with jurisdic-
tional discovery orders creates a presumption that the discovery would yield jurisdictional
information unfavorable to the defendant. See Faris, supra note 38, at 1454–55.  The au- R
thor discounts this theory, however, because its use would discourage judges from using
sanctions as a deterrent. Id.
98 See supra notes 82, 91 and accompanying text. R
99 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule
is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.”).
100 See Weinstein, supra note 9, at 296–97 (citing United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d R
1126, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002); People v. Middleton, 429 N.E.2d 100, 103 (N.Y. 1981)).
101 See Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a Co-
Conspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 281, 286 (2011) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895)).
102 The court, in fact, relies almost exclusively on e360 in its discussion of waiver as a
result of default judgment. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114,
134–36 (2d Cir. 2011).
103 Id. at 134–35 (citing e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir.
2007)).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN105.txt unknown Seq: 16  7-NOV-13 12:38
240 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:225
Although the defendant in e360 raised the affirmative defense of
personal jurisdiction before defaulting on the judgment, it is signifi-
cant that it neither filed a motion to dismiss nor engaged in jurisdic-
tional discovery.104  To determine personal jurisdiction in that case,
the district court would have had to engage in its own jurisdictional
discovery and formulate its own arguments for and against personal
jurisdiction.105  The court in e360 expressed concern about requiring
a district court to raise defenses that the defendant had elected not to
pursue itself.106  The court was especially uneasy in light of the fact
that at the time the defendant’s counsel withdrew from the proceed-
ings, the defendant expressed its intention to “participate in the de-
fense no further” and “do absolutely nothing.”107
At the heart of the e360 decision is the judicial-efficiency concern
noted by the Supreme Court in Burger King.108  The court’s analysis in
e360 echoes the jurisdictional determination process prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Burger King: the court should begin with the pur-
poseful actions of the defendant and then consider those actions in
the context of other factors, including judicial efficiency and fairness
to the plaintiff.109  The court in e360 appropriately started by consider-
ing the defendant’s deliberate default, failure to make any attempt to
pursue its affirmative defenses, and expressed intention to abandon
the defense altogether.110  This consideration was then put in context
of the burden that would befall the district court if it were effectively
called upon to raise, research, and argue the issue of personal jurisdic-
tion itself.111
The Second Circuit in Mickalis Pawn, however, erred in its appli-
cation of e360 in the same way it erred in its theoretical explanation of
personal jurisdiction.  The Second Circuit identified that the defend-
ants had abandoned their defense at the risk of default, but the Sec-
ond Circuit went no further.112  It stopped short of examining the
burden on the district court and the resulting efficiency or ineffi-
104 See e360, 500 F.3d at 596–97.
105 One author explains that sua sponte motions by the court for personal jurisdiction
are inappropriate because “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is not a right of the court.  If personal
jurisdiction were an issue of court power, the doctrine [of waiver] would make little sense.”
Brownstein, supra note 94, at 163. R
106 See e360, 500 F.3d at 599.
107 Id. at 596, 600 (quoting Transcript of Record at 3, 5, e360 Insight v. Spamhaus
Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4169)).
108 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. R
109 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985).
110 e360, 500 F.3d at 599.
111 Id. at 599 (denying any obligation of the district court to conduct an affirmative
inquiry into personal jurisdiction or research the factual bases for jurisdiction prior to
entering a default judgment).
112 See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 135 (2d Cir. 2011).
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ciency.113  Unlike the defendant in e360, the defendants in Mickalis
Pawn had, in fact, engaged in jurisdictional discovery, filed two mo-
tions to dismiss, and argued those motions before the court.114  Al-
though the court had not yet rendered a definitive ruling on the issue
of personal jurisdiction,115 the defendants had properly given the
court the tools to do so.  This fact, however, was overlooked by the
Second Circuit.  The Second Circuit effectively ignored the jurisdic-
tional goal of efficiency inherent in the law of amenability116 and pro-
moted in Burger King.117
The Second Circuit further overlooked the Seventh Circuit’s em-
phasis on fairness to the litigants in its analysis.  In an opinion preced-
ing both Mickalis Pawn and e360, the Seventh Circuit expressed
concern that in the absence of waiver rules, defendants could strategi-
cally wait to see how well or poorly the trial was going before pressing
the personal-jurisdiction defense.118  Fairness to plaintiffs is primarily
a federalist concern, as states have an interest in protecting the rights
of its citizens who may be plaintiffs in other states’ courts.119
The Second Circuit, however, made no mention of fairness.  This
omission is critical in light of the fact that Mickalis Pawn lacked the
patent unfairness evident in e360.  Unlike the defendant in e360 who
expressed its intention to “do absolutely nothing,”120 Mickalis Pawn
unambiguously stated its intention to continue to press the defense of
lack of personal jurisdiction.121  The plaintiff in Mickalis Pawn was
113 See id. at 135–36.
114 Id. at 121.
115 See City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 369, 416 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (establishing the plaintiff’s burden of proof here as only to establish a substantial
likelihood that all the elements of jurisdiction could be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence at trial).
116 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV. 241, 246–47; Spampata, supra note 22, at 1759–60 (citing Clermont, supra note 11, at R
414 & n.9; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 293–309 (1956)).  One author questions whether
the Supreme Court has been successful in instilling efficiency into the Court’s theory of
personal jurisdiction but maintains that efficiency remains important when the Court con-
siders personal jurisdiction in relation to its other jurisdictional counterparts: subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction and venue.  Spampata, supra note 22, at 1759–60. R
117 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985).
118 Rice v. Nova Biomed. Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1994).  The court in Rice
explained that fairness would be disserved “if the defendant, having raised an objection to
personal jurisdiction at the outset as required, could without any penalty fail or refuse to
press it, creating the impression that he had abandoned it, and not seek to correct that
impression until he appealed from an adverse final judgment on the merits.” Id.
119 See Weinstein, supra note 9, at 228–29.  Weinstein points out that the policy goal of R
fairness is inextricably related to the goal of efficiency, as fairness to plaintiffs “is part of a
common law rule of interstate venue by which the Supreme Court has attempted to allo-
cate judicial power among the states efficiently and fairly.” Id.
120 Transcript of Record, supra note 107, at 3, 5.
121 City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2011).
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acutely aware of Mickalis Pawn’s intention to continue to press the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction and had every opportunity to
prepare for it.  Similarly, there was no threat of judicial abuse by Mick-
alis Pawn: unlike the situation alluded to by the Seventh Circuit in its
waiver opinions, the defendants in Mickalis Pawn had not waited to
evaluate their chances at trial before asserting their jurisdictional de-
fense—they pressed it immediately.122
The Second Circuit further complicated the issue by referring to
the lack of “finality” in the personal jurisdiction decision below.123  Al-
though finality of judgment is a prerequisite to appellate review,124
finality of judgment is wholly distinct from the issue of whether the
question was preserved for appeal.125  A rule that failing to wait for
finality of judgment amounts to a waiver of personal jurisdiction is
practically unworkable.126  Finally, it is not clear that the district court
did not make a final determination on the issue of personal jurisdic-
tion: it did, after all, deny three separate motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.127
C. Consequences
1. Efficiency and Fairness of the Ruling
These errors result in an inefficient outcome.  Defendants seek-
ing to challenge personal jurisdiction can typically opt either to de-
fault entirely and collaterally attack the judgment or to appear and
challenge the court’s jurisdiction directly.128  This second option ex-
pedites the process, but the defendant is bound by the jurisdictional
decision rendered by the court, though the decision may still be chal-
122 Id. at 120.  The suit was initiated on May 15, 2006, and both Mickalis Pawn and
Adventure Outdoors moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on August 8, 2006.
Id.
123 Id. at 140–41.
124 See GARN H. WEBB & THOMAS C. BIANCO, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND FEDERAL PROCE-
DURE 49 (1970).
125 Indeed, the Second Circuit addressed it separately from the question of whether
the personal-jurisdiction defense had been waived. See Mickalis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 140–41.
126 If this were the rule, we would ask when the personal jurisdiction defense has been
waived.  The defense is not waived simply because the district court hedges in its language
denying the motion to dismiss.
127 See Mickalis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 121, 123.  The finding of “substantial likelihood” here
is even higher than the standard proposed by some scholars. See Kevin M. Clermont, Juris-
dictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 992 (2006) (arguing that the standard should be
“more likely than not” unless the jurisdictional facts overlap with the facts of the claim).
The Second Circuit, however, was somewhat inconsistent in its characterization of the mo-
tions, noting in one place that the district court had determined that a “prima facie” case
had been made, Mickalis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 118, and elsewhere using the language of “sub-
stantial likelihood” id. at 121.
128 Peter A. Diana & J. Michael Register, Recent Developments, Personal Jurisdiction in
Flux: Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
136, 143 n.33 (1983).
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lenged on appeal.129  In Mickalis Pawn, the defendants only intended
to challenge the personal jurisdiction of the court.130  The defendants
still appeared in the action, however, if only to file a motion to dis-
miss.131  This choice proved to be fatal, despite the fact that it was
actually the most efficient one.  Rather than decline to appear in the
action at all, wait for the district court to make a determination on the
merits, wait until the plaintiffs tried to enforce the judgment in the
defendants’ home state, and then challenge the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court collaterally, the defendants in Mickalis Pawn opted to attack
the jurisdiction directly and receive a more immediate disposition of
the case.  Not only did the defendants save themselves the uncertainty
of waiting for a default judgment to be enforced against them at some
undetermined time, they also saved (or attempted to save) the re-
sources of all parties involved by focusing their efforts on the only
issue in which they had confidence: personal jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit, however, made no mention of these consid-
erations, despite Burger King’s insistence that the judicial system’s in-
terest in efficient resolution is a relevant consideration for questions
of personal jurisdiction.132  The omission is especially strange because
New York courts have a distinct federalist interest in determining their
own jurisdiction.133  The decision in Mickalis Pawn encourages defend-
ants like Mickalis Pawn and Adventure Outdoors, who only want to
challenge personal jurisdiction in an action, to default on actions
brought against them in a Second Circuit court, and then let their
own state or federal court determine the jurisdictional reach of the
Second Circuit court.  This system works well as a check on interstate
power, but it is in the interest of New York courts to determine their
own jurisdictional reach instead of relying upon foreign courts to set
the jurisdictional boundaries.  While this federalist interest should be
tempered by the efficiency and fairness concerns outlined above, it
should at least be considered by the court because it might be the
deciding factor in a close case like Mickalis Pawn.
129 Id. (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522, 531 (1931)).
130 See 645 F.3d at 122.
131 See id.
132 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (citing World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
133 See Cebik, supra note 19, at 15–16. Cebik notes that jurisdictional rules help a state R
frame its jurisdictional boundaries so that other states will not challenge its authority.  Op-
timizing the balance of authority, according to Cebik, is a central goal of personal jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 16 (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (1966)).
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2. Effect on the Underlying Goals of Waiver
The Second Circuit’s incomplete statement of the law ultimately
led to a misunderstanding of the purpose of waiver.  Punitive sanc-
tions and waivers, like the one imposed in Insurance Corp. of Ireland
and the one imposed in Mickalis Pawn, are only useful to the extent
that they deter other litigants from engaging in similar behavior.134
This justification only works, however, if the behavior itself is undesir-
able; in other words, punitive waiver should only be imposed to dis-
courage behavior that is harmful to the judicial system or undesirable
in terms of fairness.  Here, it is unclear how the Second Circuit in
Mickalis Pawn could have determined whether Mickalis Pawn’s and
Adventure Outdoors’ behavior was undesirable without evaluating its
effects on judicial efficiency and fairness to the litigants.
Instead, the Second Circuit employed a strictly individual-rights-
based approach to personal jurisdiction that produced a rigid rule
that failed to account for the additional factors mentioned in Burger
King.  Under such a rule, the court does not analyze the underlying
goals of personal jurisdiction.  Instead, the waiver is strictly punitive
and may punish a defendant for taking action that is actually more
efficient or fairer than the status quo.
III
THE FUTURE OF WAIVER IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Admittedly, it is not clear that the Second Circuit came to the
wrong conclusion on the ultimate issue of waiver.  From a judicial-
efficiency standpoint, having two distinct and easily defined options
for responding to a lawsuit might be more desirable than having a
more flexible standard of waiver that requires a rigorous and in-depth
analysis of the parties.  Similarly, predictability is an element of fair-
ness in that plaintiffs should be able to prepare their cases with some
notion of the litigation strategies available to the defendants.135
Additionally, although Adventure Outdoors expressed at default
that it would appeal any default judgment against it, it is unclear
whether Adventure Outdoors ever expressed its intention to continue
to pursue the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.136  It may have
been unfair, then, for Adventure Outdoors to continue to assert the
134 See Faris, supra note 38, at 1455.  One author argues that, especially in the context R
of discovery sanctions, every sanction seems to carry a punitive aspect. Id. at 1454–55.  This
is not always the case with waiver, however, because personal jurisdiction can be and is
frequently waived voluntarily.
135 Cf. Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (explaining
the undesirability of uncertainty in the law with regard to the ability of litigants and per-
sons to plan their activities).
136 See Mickalis Pawn, 645 F.3d at 124.
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defense if it appeared to the plaintiff and to the court that the defen-
dant had abandoned the defense.
Even with these possibilities in mind, though, Mickalis Pawn is
problematic in that it does not lay a clear framework for district courts
to follow.
A. Theoretical Framework
Mickalis Pawn’s incomplete theoretical framework is likely to
cause problems for district courts trying to adhere to the standards
and theories laid out by the Second Circuit.  First, because the Second
Circuit’s analysis is largely silent on the role federalist interests play in
personal jurisdiction, district courts are unable to determine whether
the Second Circuit has implicitly rejected a personal-jurisdiction
framework that incorporates federalist interests or has merely failed to
fully discuss the latent federalist framework that underlies Burger King.
Although the Second Circuit’s holding provides a case for direct fac-
tual comparison, the facts of Mickalis Pawn are unique enough to be
of little help to district courts seeking a framework to decide cases
arising under new sets of facts.137  Without a firm grasp on the per-
sonal jurisdiction framework, this task will likely prove difficult.
A district court in the Second Circuit may, for example, encoun-
ter a case like Philos Technologies, Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc.138  In this Sev-
enth Circuit case, two of the defendants had responded to the
plaintiff’s complaint by sending a pro se “Response Letter” to the dis-
trict court claiming that they had no business affiliation with the plain-
tiff and seeking a dismissal.139  After default and entry of judgment,
the defendants moved to void the judgment for lack of jurisdiction,
but the district court refused to consider the issue of personal jurisdic-
tion because it had been waived by the defendants’ failure to press the
issue when they had the chance.140  The Seventh Circuit reversed, say-
ing that because pro se letters are held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”141 the court should give
“heightened judicial solicitude” when “asked to construe a pro se liti-
gant’s filing in such a manner as to deny that litigant the opportunity
to present a jurisdictional defense.”142  The Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that the pro se letter did not constitute an appearance by the
137 The Second Circuit, after all, described this case as one of “first impression.” Id. at
118.
138 645 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2011).
139 Id. at 853.
140 Id. at 854.
141 Id. at 858 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).
142 Id. at 858.
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defendant so there could not have been a waiver of personal
jurisdiction.143
If such a case came to a Second Circuit district court, it would be
difficult to resolve using the holding of Mickalis Pawn.  For example,
the Seventh Circuit considered fairness to the pro se defendant in its
analysis of waiver, but a Second Circuit district court would be unsure
whether such a consideration was proper because Mickalis Pawn is si-
lent on the issue of fairness to either the plaintiff or the defendant.
The Seventh Circuit also considered the evinced intent of the defend-
ants in their pro se filings—a consideration that likely demonstrates
the court’s concern for fairness to the plaintiffs.144  Though both de-
fendants expressed their intent to pursue the jurisdictional defense in
Mickalis Pawn, the court did not incorporate this fact into its discus-
sion of waiver.  How, then, should the district court incorporate intent
into its analysis? Mickalis Pawn does not say one way or the other.
This omission is striking in light of the fact that Mickalis Pawn relies
heavily on Seventh Circuit precedent, especially e360, to come to its
conclusion about waiver.145
Second, if the omission of federalist interests represents a rejec-
tion of their importance, then Mickalis Pawn is at least partially at odds
with Burger King.  This tension is problematic even in cases of personal
jurisdiction that do not involve waiver.  Waiver is, after all, an aspect of
personal jurisdiction, and its theoretical foundation is inextricably
tied to that of personal jurisdiction.146  The Second Circuit, then, can-
not discount efficiency and fairness factors when discussing waiver of
personal jurisdiction but still consider those factors when examining
personal jurisdiction in general.  This is especially troubling because
the Second Circuit has explicitly adopted the reasonableness test and
factors described in Asahi and Burger King.147
Thus, a district court might read Mickalis Pawn as a rejection of
judicial efficiency and fairness to plaintiffs when considering personal
jurisdiction in any context.  This seems largely at odds with the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Burger King.  It should be noted, however,
that Burger King described factors like judicial efficiency and plaintiffs’
interests as factors that courts “may” consider in “appropriate
143 Id. at 859.
144 See id. at 858–59.  The intent of the defendants, in fact, seemed to be the most
crucial part of the case for the Seventh Circuit. See id.
145 See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citing e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2007); Rice v. Nova Bi-
omed. Corp., 38 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 1994); Cont’l Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293 (7th
Cir. 1993)).
146 See Weinstein, supra note 9, at 296. R
147 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 1996).
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case[s].”148  While it is unclear what kind of “appropriate cases” the
Court is referring to, surely it did not mean to foreclose the considera-
tion of these factors in all personal jurisdiction cases, which may be
the practical effect of Mickalis Pawn in lower courts.149
The district courts, then, are left with a conundrum.  They can
(1) adopt a broad interpretation of Mickalis Pawn by discounting fed-
eralist interests in all personal jurisdiction cases while effectively un-
dermining the Supreme Court’s ruling in Burger King, (2) incorporate
federalist interests into waiver of personal jurisdiction in accordance
with Burger King while effectively undermining the Second Circuit’s
ruling in Mickalis Pawn, or (3) narrowly follow Mickalis Pawn by ignor-
ing federalist interests in the context of waiver of personal jurisdiction
but incorporate such considerations when establishing personal juris-
diction in other contexts.  This third outcome is the most likely, as it
runs the lowest risk of being overturned on appeal,150 but it creates an
internal inconsistency within the Second Circuit’s theory of personal
jurisdiction.151  This tension can manifest itself through unpredictabil-
ity, unfairness, and inefficiency.  Furthermore, cases that blur the line
between waiver of personal jurisdiction and the broader issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction will be especially problematic for district court
judges who may be confused as to which theoretical framework to ap-
ply.  This distinction is critical, as the choice of theoretical framework
may be dispositive on the outcome of the case.
B. Practical Application
Even after dismissing the theoretical tension arising from the Sec-
ond Circuit’s ruling in Mickalis Pawn, practical application of the rule
in Mickalis Pawn is also challenging.  The first question that courts
under Mickalis Pawn must decide is: What amounts to an abandon-
ment of the jurisdictional defense? Mickalis Pawn relies on the Sev-
enth Circuit to answer that question, but since the Seventh Circuit
148 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (alterations in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
149 Burger King notes that these considerations are useful either to establish jurisdiction
when there is a “lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required” or
to defeat jurisdiction when a defendant has clear minimal contacts with the forum.  But
these considerations establish that jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. at 477.  This list
seems to include virtually every personal-jurisdiction case.
150 Empirical data suggests that judges are sensitive to the threat of being overruled
and will adjust their rulings accordingly if overruled consistently on the same issues. See
Joseph L. Smith, Patterns and Consequences of Judicial Reversals: Theoretical Considerations and
Data from a District Court, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 28, 29–30 (2006).
151 It is too soon to determine how lower courts will interpret Mickalis Pawn.  Thus far,
Second Circuit district courts have cited Mickalis Pawn’s waiver discussion primarily for the
proposition that personal jurisdiction can be waived. See, e.g., China Nat’l Chartering
Corp. v. Pactrans Air & Sea, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Digital Sin, Inc. v.
Does 1–27, No. 12 Civ. 3873(JMF), 2012 WL 2036035, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012).
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uses the expressed intent of the defendant and fairness to the litigants
as crucial parts of its test,152 Mickalis Pawn, by disposing of those con-
siderations, gives district courts little to rely on.  Without the princi-
ples of efficiency and fairness to consider, district courts must simply
evaluate whether the case before it is factually similar enough to Mick-
alis Pawn to warrant a waiver of personal jurisdiction.
Similarly, there is no weighing mechanism for district courts to
evaluate defendants’ behavior.  Even if the Second Circuit meant that
efficiency and fairness are not appropriate considerations and that the
actions of the defendant should be the sole focus of the analysis, the
Second Circuit did not provide an evaluative method for measuring
defendants’ conduct.  Again, factual similarity is the only tool that dis-
trict courts are equipped with to determine future cases.
Factual comparisons, admittedly, are part of what district courts
must do, but such comparisons should be made in the context of
workable principles of law.153  In the absence of principles giving rela-
tive weight to determinative facts, district courts may be indirectly
called upon to “fill the theoretical void” through “casuistical judg-
ments at the point of application.”154  Such a setup has its own
problems with efficiency and fairness.155
District courts must also consider how the ruling of Mickalis Pawn
affects other constitutionally protected individual rights.  The Su-
preme Court has announced that fundamental constitutional rights
are entitled to “every reasonable presumption against waiver.”156  If
the Second Circuit describes personal jurisdiction as exclusively an in-
dividual right under the Due Process Clause, then isn’t personal juris-
diction entitled to the same presumption?  And if this exercise of
waiver is appropriate, then should other constitutional rights be ana-
lyzed under the same liberal standards of waiver?  Excluding any con-
sideration of federalist interests from personal jurisdiction seems to
create some dissonance among constitutional rights that cannot be
readily resolved.  District courts will either have to accept the disso-
nance and structure their opinions around purely factual comparisons
152 See supra notes 110, 119 and accompanying text. R
153 See Yavar Bathaee, Comment, Incompletely Theorized Agreements: An Unworkable Theory
of Judicial Modesty, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1457, 1470 (2007) (“Predefined principles deter-
mine which facts are relevant and should be used for comparison.  Principles also deter-
mine whether the ultimate outcome of the analogy is sound.  Therefore, principles must
be defined a priori, because they do not emerge simply through the analogical process.”).
154 Id. at 1460, 1462 (second quotation quoting CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35 (1998)).
155 See id. at 1480–81 (arguing that incomplete theorization in precedent invites lower
courts to engage in their own theorization to enable analogical reasoning and, possibly,
overstep their bounds in doing so).
156 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy,
301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
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or import the reasoning from Mickalis Pawn into other constitutional
rights.  Neither of these outcomes is desirable or efficient.
C. Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction Going Forward
It is admittedly too soon to determine the ultimate impact of
Mickalis Pawn in the Second Circuit.  Its problematic framework may
be ignored by courts altogether as its incomplete description of waiver
provides little framework on which district courts can rely.
One possibility is that the holding of Mickalis Pawn should and
will be cabined to its individual facts.  This might have been the case if
not for the notable absence of factual discussion in Mickalis Pawn.  Af-
ter a lengthy discussion about waiver’s status as an individual right, the
Second Circuit reduces the application of that legal discussion to a
single sentence.157  Although the Second Circuit incompletely de-
scribes waiver as purely an individual right, it nevertheless devotes a
good portion of this section to a discussion of the existing state of the
law.158  To a district court, Mickalis Pawn looks like a complete frame-
work for waiver of personal jurisdiction—one that can be applied in
factually dissimilar cases.
Thus far, at least one court has cited Mickalis Pawn in its analysis
of waiver.  In China National Chartering Corp. v. Pactrans Air & Sea, Inc.,
the district court found no waiver of personal jurisdiction despite the
plaintiff’s myriad of arguments to the contrary.159  Most notably, how-
ever, the district court analyzed two key issues, the filing of a third-
party complaint and the “substantial delay” in filing a motion to dis-
miss, using a framework strikingly similar to that in Mickalis Pawn.160
On both of these issues, the court focused exclusively on the defen-
dant’s actions in the case without any discussion of fairness or judicial
efficiency.161  This omission is notable because both of these questions
seem to implicate questions about judicial efficiency and fairness to
the plaintiff.162
The court ultimately concluded that there had been no waiver of
personal jurisdiction, but its application of Mickalis-Pawn–like consid-
erations may suggest that district courts will begin to collapse their
analysis of waiver into a purely individual-rights-based consideration.
157 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
158 Id.
159 See 882 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
160 See id. at 588–91, 593.
161 See id.
162 For example, in its discussion of substantial delay, the court noted that the jurisdic-
tional defense was not practically available to the defendant before the motion to dismiss
was filed because of changing case law. See id. at 593.  The court made no mention, how-
ever, of the judicial inefficiency that may emerge if changes in case law do not toll the time
defendants are typically allotted to file a motion to dismiss. See id.
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On the other hand, the district court’s ultimate findings in China Na-
tional may suggest that the district court felt no need to “pile on” rea-
sons for finding no waiver of personal jurisdiction.  Like the opinion
in Mickalis Pawn, however, there is little discussion about the theoreti-
cal framework underlying waiver of personal jurisdiction and even less
about the relevant factors that inform the discussion.
CONCLUSION
The landscape of personal jurisdiction still remains largely un-
clear.  The Supreme Court has expressed, however, a lingering con-
cern for the federalist interests that once exclusively provided the
bedrock foundation for personal jurisdiction.  Until the Supreme
Court clarifies its position on the theoretical groundwork for personal
jurisdiction (which may, admittedly, never come), district and circuit
courts must be sensitive to the complexity and depth of the law.
Mickalis Pawn does not represent a failure by the Second Circuit
to understand the law, but rather it marks a failure to fully incorpo-
rate and discuss the competing ideas that make up the law of personal
jurisdiction.  Complete explanation of the law of personal jurisdiction
is no less important when the court is dealing with questions of waiver:
key to the future success of personal jurisdiction is a comprehensive
theory that accounts for each subtle detail and decision that defines
personal jurisdiction.
Such a comprehensive theory must strive to account for the feder-
alist interests revived by the Supreme Court in Burger King.  Even as
courts recognize that personal jurisdiction exists primarily as an indi-
vidual right, the Supreme Court has not yet abandoned the funda-
mentally federalist interests of judicial efficiency, fairness to the
litigants, and the interests of the forum state.  While the Court has not
yet fully defined the role of these interests, it is clear that they must
continue to play some part in the theory of personal jurisdiction and,
consequently, in the theory of waiver as well.
Going forward, the Second Circuit and other circuits must be
aware of the impact that their theory of personal jurisdiction will have
on their own rulings and the rulings of district courts in their circuits.
As the issue of waiver becomes more complicated, district courts re-
quire fuller and more complete explanations of the theory of personal
jurisdiction that can also be practically applied to novel fact patterns.
Mickalis Pawn represents the danger of incomplete statements of
law and theory.  In order to unify personal jurisdiction with the appli-
cation of waiver, courts must be willing to discuss and develop the
theory in full.  If the federalist goals of personal jurisdiction are to
remain relevant, they must be recognized and detailed in all contexts.
